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1. Overview  
The Syrian conflict is now in its seventh year and involves a wide range of both national and 
international parties. Crucially, no party is in a position to establish control over the entire 
country. This has implications for efforts at stabilisation.
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 There is increasing recognition that the 
Assad regime cannot be displaced and hence must factor in efforts to find a political solution. 
The recent focus has been on ways to reduce the fighting, paving the way for transition talks. 
Two major processes have been underway to find a solution to the Syrian conflict: the ‘Geneva 
process’ under the auspices of the UN, and the ‘Astana process’ led by Russia, Iran and Turkey. 
The latter differs from the former in that it involves armed groups and seeks to find a way to end 
the fighting before then working on a political settlement. Progress was made at the latest round 
of Astana talks in May, with endorsement of four ceasefire zones in the country which would 
allow the return of displaced civilians and provision of humanitarian aid to those areas.   
However, efforts to reach a political settlement face a number of key challenges: What to do 
about the Assad regime? Which of the opposition groups to include in transition talks? Can the 
territorial integrity of Syria be preserved? How to reconcile diverse and sometimes contradictory 
objectives (notably desire for peace vs. need to hold those responsible for human rights 
violations to account)? Even if a way can be found to end the fighting, post-conflict stabilisation 
challenges will include: resettlement of displaced civilians (many will not be able to return to the 
areas they came from); dealing with the massive and ongoing humanitarian crisis, and 
reconstruction; and the question of accountability for human rights violations.    
Suggested stabilisation options include the formation of a Syrian National Stabilisation Force 
(SNSF) comprising Syrians to enforce law and order on the ground and allow a negotiation 
process to take place to reach a political settlement. The EU has been urged to no longer make 
economic assistance to Syria conditional on regime change, but direct support to non-regime 
areas and critical sectors and tie recovery assistance to a sustained ceasefire. Others have 
identified security sector reform as the priority, stressing the need for withdrawal of foreign 
fighters, followed by a constitutional framework for the transition process, decentralisation, 
reconstruction and return of refugees, and a comprehensive transitional justice programme – all 
underlaid by an end to fighting. 
Lessons from other conflicts, notably Afghanistan and Iraq, include: a) the need to focus on 
establishing strong, central government rather than focusing first on democracy and markets - 
although this risks creating an authoritarian government; b) stabilisation can begin even while 
peace negotiations are underway; c) realistic goals should be set keeping capacities in view; d) it 
is important to focus on localism and initiate bottom-up discussions on Syria’s future; e) 
stabilisation should be given priority over counter-terrorism; f) stabilisation requires integrated 
civilian leadership across developmental, security and diplomatic functions.   
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 The US Institute for Peace defines stabilisation as ‘ending or preventing the recurrence of violent conflict and 
creating the conditions for normal economic activity and nonviolent politics’ (Freear, 2016: 1). It lists five ‘end 
states’ towards which all stabilisation activities should be directed: safe and secure environment; rule of law; 
stable governance; sustainable economy; and social well-being (ibid). The UK government defines stabilisation 
as ‘one of the approaches used in situations of violent conflict which is designed to protect and promote 
legitimate political authority, using a combination of integrated civilian and military actions to reduce violence, re-
establish security and prepare for longer-term recovery by building an enabling environment for structural 
stability’ (UK, 2014: 1). 
3 
2. Conflict dynamics 
 The Syrian conflict is not being fought between two parties, but rather is a multi-faceted 
one involving numerous actors. As well as the ‘primary’ conflict between the Assad 
regime and Syrian opposition groups, there are hostilities between different Syrian 
opposition groups (notably ‘moderates’ and extremists’); with the Kurds; with Islamic 
State; between extremist groups (ISIL
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 and Jubhat al-Nusrah); and a proxy conflict 
between Russia, Iran and Hezbollah supporting the Assad regime, and the West backing 
‘moderate’ opposition groups. Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar and Turkey are also involved, 
supporting diverse Syrian opposition including extremist groups – the former two 
countries largely backing groups in the south, and the latter countries those in the north.
3
 
Turkey is strongly opposed to the Kurds who control the Rojova territory. 
 Control of Syrian territory is currently divided among the Assad regime, moderate and 
extremist Syrian opposition groups, ISIL and the Kurds.  
 The Syrian opposition is highly fragmented and disorganised, with no coordinated 
national strategy to tackle the regime. While the main split is between ‘moderate’ and 
more extremist groups, there is also strong rivalry between the two main extremist 
groups: ISIL and Jubhat al-Nusrah. Overall, the role of ‘jihadist’ elements in the 
opposition movement has increased. 
 While the Assad regime has made significant advances in recent months, thanks to 
Russian military assistance (notably air-force), it is not poised to establish control over 
the entire country. Similarly, opposition groups do not appear to be in a position to topple 
the regime (particularly with limited western military support) (Kodmani, 2015). There is 
thus a stalemate – neither side can defeat the other.  
 The conflict in Syria is increasingly becoming a sectarian one (Jenkins, 2013). Many 
Sunni forces under the regime defected to rebel groups. The regime is bolstered by 
military units of local and foreign Shi’a fighters (Kodmani, 2015). The latter in particular 
are motivated by the desire to preserve Shi’a holy sites in Syria rather than loyalty or 
commitment to Assad. 
 Iran is strongly committed to preserving the regime; it fears Assad’s ouster could lead to 
similar efforts in Iran to bring down the Islamic Republic (Jenkins, 2013; Kodmani, 2015). 
Iran would also lose an important ally in the region. Iran has pushed Hezobollah to help 
the Syrian government, as well as helped mobilise Shi’a volunteers in Iraq and Lebanon.  
 The West is reluctant to provide substantial military support to opposition groups for fear 
of Assad being replaced with an extremist Islamist government and out of fear that 
advanced weapons could get into the hands of extremist groups and be used to target 
the West (Jenkins, 2013; Kodmani, 2015). 
 The war has led to an erosion of national institutions, including the country’s armed 
forces, to be replaced by a patchwork of increasingly autonomous local entities. The 
government does not even have direct control of some of the militias fighting to preserve 
the regime (Jenkins, 2013). This has implications for any future settlement, as even if the 
armed forces are neutralised, there are hundreds of autonomous military formations and 
criminal groups. 
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 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)/ Islamic 
State(IS)/Da’esh 
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 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-syria-idUSKBN19517O 
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3. Attempts to reach a political solution 
Alongside the official UN-led process aimed at finding a political solution, ‘various combinations 
of “honest brokers” have attempted to land the final deal: Iran and Russia, Russia and the US, 
and most recently Russia, Iran and Turkey. The main challenge is to design a political transition 
process acceptable to all sides of the conflict (EPRS, 2017: 2).  
UN and other initiatives 
 UN Special Envoy Kofi Annan put forward a Six-Point Proposal in March 2012, but both 
he and his successor Lakhdar Brahimi, resigned in the absence of genuine talks; 
 2012 Geneva Communique called for the establishment of a transitional governing body, 
review of the constitutional order, and free elections, but progress on implementation has 
been very slow;  
 2014 Geneva II Conference, aimed at giving new impetus to implementation of the 
Geneva Communique, broke down after just one month;  
 UN (current) Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura presented a new plan, endorsed by the 
UN Security Council (UNSC) in July 2015, to establish intra-Syrian working groups to 
address key aspects of the Geneva Communique (e.g. safety and protection of civilians, 
and political and constitutional issues pertaining to the formation of a transitional 
government), with the aim of producing a ‘Syrian-owned framework document’ on 
implementation of the Communique (EPRS, 2017); 
 In October 2015, intensification of military operations in Syria and a worsening 
humanitarian crisis, provided impetus to reinvigorate the diplomatic process. The US, 
Russia, a group of 17 countries, plus the European Union, the UN and the Arab League, 
formed the International Syria Support Group (ISSG). In November 2015 the ISSG 
issued a joint statement expressing their commitment to ensuring ‘a Syrian-led and 
Syrian-owned political transition based on the Geneva Communique in its entirety’. 
Significantly the ISSG included Iran, previously not invited to negotiations on Syria 
(EPRS, 2017).  
 On 18 December 2015 the UNSC adopted Resolution 2254 which still refers to a 
transitional governing body, but more immediately calls for ‘credible, inclusive and non-
sectarian governance’, the drafting of a new constitution and UN-supervised elections 
(Lund, 2017). ‘By shifting focus to incidental political arrangements, the UN  is subtly de-
emphasising the irreconcilable disputes over how to interpret transitional language 
inherited from 2012, thereby unlocking the prospect of a peace process that ultimately 
allows al-Assad to stay in power (Lund, 2017); 
 Russia and Turkey brokered a ceasefire in December 2016, including a monitoring 
mechanism for violations. This led to adoption of UNSC Resolution 2336 on 31 
December 2016, which paved the way for the Astana process (see below) and 
resumption of intra-Syrian talks under UN auspices in February 2017 (EPRS, 2017). 
Astana process 
 The Astana process is being led by Russia, Iran and Turkey. It was initiated in January 
2017, with further rounds in February, March and May. Unlike in Geneva, where the goal 
has been to reach a political rather than military solution, the aim in Astana is to bring 
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armed groups together in order to reach a military agreement that results in a political 
accord (Balanche, 2017).  
 Participants include the three sponsors, the Syrian government and some of the armed 
opposition groups in Syria, but not ISIL and not the Kurds (excluded at Turkey’s 
insistence) (Balanche, 2017); the US has been present in an observer capacity. 
 The latest (3-4 May 2017) round of talks in Astana led to endorsement of a Russian 
proposal to set up four de-escalation zones in the northern part of Homs, Idlib, East 
Ghouta and southern Syria, with the borders of these areas encircled by safety zones 
hosting centres to monitor the cease-fire (Balanche, 2017). The ceasefire zones will allow 
delivery of humanitarian aid and return of displaced civilians (Klein, 2017). Military 
operations elsewhere in the country, including against ISIL, will continue.   
 The Russian proposal appears to have the support of all major international players as 
well as the Syrian government (Klein, 2017). 
 While the Astana process is depicted by the sponsors as supporting the UN-led process, 
there are concerns that it could be a parallel initiative and undermine the latter (EPRS, 
2017); the US has also expressed concern about Iranian involvement as a guarantor of 
the proposed cease-fire zones (Klein, 2017).  
Other stabilisation options 
 The dominant position among European states to date has been that no economic 
support will be channelled to Assad until the regime commits to a meaningful transition 
process. Barnes-Dacey (2017) argues that this ‘insistence on linking economic 
assistance to a political transition ignores the reality on the ground, where the regime is 
more dominant than ever, and its longstanding unwillingness to negotiate its own 
demise’. Worse, he says this approach will contribute to the deepening impoverishment 
of the Syrian people. He calls instead from a national stabilisation approach that focuses 
on both stepped-up assistance to non-regime areas and a less restrictive approach to 
Damascus: recovery support should be tied to implementation of a sustained ceasefire in 
areas not part of anti-ISIS operations, and full humanitarian access. Increased assistance 
should focus on critical sectors, e.g. healthcare, education, core infrastructure, and 
should mostly be driven by engagement with local actors and the UN rather than 
government institutions in Damascus.  
 Syrian National Stabilization Force (SNSF) – Hof et al (2015: 9) recommend recruiting, 
training, equipping and deploying a Syrian National Stabilization Force (SNSF) consisting 
exclusively of Syrians but funded and otherwise supported by the US/other countries. Its 
military mission would be to defeat those obstructing stabilisation and the establishment 
of legitimate, inclusive governance in all of Syria. The rationale for the SNSF is that there 
will not be ‘a political-diplomatic solution opening a pathway to legitimate governance 
without military facts that make diplomacy feasible and productive’ (Hof et al, 2015: 8).To 
ensure legitimacy, Hof et al strongly recommend that a temporary Syrian advisory task 
force be set up to guide the SNSF’s formation. In the longer-term the proposed SNSF 
would ensure security during the negotiation process to reach a political solution and 
‘avoid another Libya’ (Kodmani, 2015: 4).  
 Kodmani (2015) identifies reform of the security sector as the priority in efforts to reach a 
settlement, and argues that this must include withdrawal of foreign fighters (pressured to 
do so by their various international backers, e.g. Turkey, Iran). This can then be followed 
by (ibid: 7):  
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a) development of a constitutional framework for the transitional process (including 
possibly using the existing constitution as a way of reassuring the governing 
authorities that some continuity is respected, while serious changes are introduced in 
a permanent constitution drafted by a constituent assembly);  
b) decentralisation to ensure a system of governance that recognises the diversity of 
Syrian society;  
c) reconstruction and the return of refugees, based on a sound distribution of 
responsibilities and funds among central and local governments, community-based 
structures and other civil society organisations;  
d) a comprehensive transitional justice programme, most of which should be scheduled 
for implementation at a later stage;  
e) stopping the fighting – experience shows that ‘parties tend to ignore or easily violate 
a ceasefire as long as they do not see that a political solution is a serious possibility’.    
4. Key challenges 
Reaching a political solution 
 What to do about Assad? – There are huge divisions over the Assad regime with some 
(Syrian opposition, USA, EU and most Arab states) wanting him gone, but others (e.g. 
Iran, Russia) seeing regime survival as crucial. So far it has proved very difficult to find 
an acceptable middle ground concerning Assad’s future. There does appear to be 
increasing acceptance – driven by pragmatism - at least among international 
stakeholders, of the continued presence of the Assad regime. However, as Kodmani 
notes ‘there is a difference between maintaining Assad and his regime unchanged, on 
the one hand, and keeping Assad in power for a given period of time until his departure 
can be scheduled as part of a planned democratic process based on constitutional 
mechanisms, on the other’ (2015: 5).  
 Who can participate in political transition process? – Opposition groups insist that Assad 
and his aides quit power at the start of the transition process. The regime opposes any 
attempts to bring ‘terrorists’ to the table: there is lack of clarity over which opposition 
groups are ‘legitimate’ and which are ‘terrorists’ (and hence can be targeted in combat 
operations). Opposition groups are also disunited, and represented by a number of 
different coalitions, e.g. the Riyadh-based High Negotiations Committee (HNC), the 
Moscow Group, the Cairo Group (EPRS, 2017: 5).  
 Can Syria’s territorial integrity be preserved? – Given that Assad cannot establish his 
authority over the entire country, and given the very divergent positions of anti- and pro-
government forces on a range of issues, it is unclear whether Syria can be preserved in 
its current form. ‘Future attempts at post-conflict stabilisation in Syria may founder, then, 
on the simple basis that “Syria” no longer constitutes a political entity that can be 
resuscitated in any meaningful shape’ (Tuck, 2016). BUT the collapse or break-up of 
Syria poses a huge threat to the overall stability of the Middle East. Hence the solution 
could entail keeping Syria in its current form but with extensive political and economic 
decentralisation, including a special status for Kurdish areas (though this latter point 
could face opposition from Turkey).  
 How to reconcile contradictory objectives? - Different parties have different objectives, 
and even objectives of individual stakeholders can be contradictory. For example, how to 
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reconcile the need for peace (which could necessitate cooperation with groups complicit 
in human rights violations) and the need for justice and reconciliation? (Tuck, 2016). 
Post-conflict stabilisation 
 The attacks and human rights violations that have been meted out by both sides mean it 
will be very difficult for displaced people to return to their homes (Jenkins, 2013). More 
likely is the solidification of ethnic and sectarian enclaves/areas across the country. 
 Syria faces a serious humanitarian crisis which is worsening; development has been set 
back by decades. Even if conflict ends tomorrow, humanitarian needs will remain critical 
for months, if not years, to come (EPRS, 2017).  
 Accountability – human rights and international humanitarian law violations have been 
carried out by all parties to the Syrian conflict, in particular the Assad regime and ISIL. It 
will be important to ascertain precisely the nature and scale of violations, identify those 
responsible and bring them to justice (Kodmani, 2015). But this will be a difficult task. 
5. Lessons from other conflicts 
 Based on experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, prioritise institutionalisation over 
liberalisation – instead of focusing first on democracy and markets, the focus should be 
on establishing strong, central government. Processes of political and economic 
liberalisation can exacerbate social tensions and undermine stability in the short and 
medium terms (Tuck, 2016). However, giving priority to strengthening host government 
institutions (judiciary, police, legislative and executive frameworks) in a future Syria ‘risks 
creating an authoritarian government that would have no interest in introducing political 
pluralism and which might simply replicate the problems that have led to the collapse of 
the Syrian state in the first place’ (ibid).  
 Freear (2016: 1) identifies a number of other lessons for stabilisation and reconstruction 
in Syria from past conflicts including in Iraq and Afghanistan: 
a) The stabilisation process can start now and it not contradictory to negotiating peace 
between warring parties; 
b) It is important to focus on ‘localism’ and start bottom-up discussions now around a 
positive political vision for the future society, economy and politics of Syria; 
c) Additional major lessons include: unifying analysis, efforts and objectives across 
actors; being realistic about capacities available; maintaining strategic patience and 
managing expectations; and identifying actors with the necessary capacities, political 
resolve and influence; 
d) In recent and ongoing conflicts, counter-terrorism policies and stabilisation strategies 
have made uneasy bedfellows: renewed prioritisation should be given to stabilisation; 
e) Stabilisation is a political task and requires integrated civilian leadership across 
developmental, security and diplomatic functions. There should be a broader 
approach to engaging a range of actors and capacities, including the regional and 
private sector. 
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6. Feasibility of applying UK stabilisation doctrine 
Four key characteristics of the UK’s approach to stabilisation, laid out in a 2014 document by the 
UK Stabilisation Unit UK, 2014), are listed below along with constraints to their application in 
Syria: 
 Any stabilisation action must be planned and implemented with an overtly political 
objective in mind, ideally with a means of identifying success and a process of transition 
to longer-term recovery – the Syrian conflict is still far from being in a transition stage; 
 Stabilisation is an integrated, civilian-led approach which unifies efforts across Her 
Majesty’s Government (HMG) – it is difficult to identify and engage appropriate civilian 
actors in Syria at this stage; 
 Stabilisation is both flexible and targeted: it is important to plan and implement local-level 
stabilisation in the context of the wider political settlement – while local level engagement 
in some non-regime areas could be feasible, in many parts of the country this will be 
impossible; moreover, Syria is far from reaching a wider political settlement; 
 Stabilisation will be transitory but cannot afford to be short-term in outlook or objectives – 
the dilemma in implementing this in Syria reflects the dilemma in reaching a political 
settlement to the conflict itself: in the short-term it will be necessary to accept and deal 
with Assad, but as yet there is no mechanism for longer-term removal of the regime, and 
it has made clear its determination to stay in power.  
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